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[aprssig] Universal APRS messaging

Lynn W. Deffenbaugh (Mr) ldeffenb at homeside.to
Sun Oct 19 23:51:54 UTC 2008


Figures, I checked my KJ4ERJ-12 track on aprs.fi right after poking send 
and found that the Tilt's GPS had me roaming around in the Gulf of 
Mexico all day.  That's what happens when you put the phone down on the 
dining room table with the client still running!  It'll happen to the 
best of GPSs (well, maybe not the BEST, but certainly to the Tilt) when 
they try to make sense out of low power and distorted signals!

Lynn (D) - KJ4ERJ-12

Lynn W. Deffenbaugh (Mr) wrote:
> It was my understanding that most IGate software by default only gates 
> Internet to RF for those stations "recently" heard "local" to the gate?  
> If this is the case, then the only abuse that can come is from messages 
> sent directly to those stations along with possibly the most recent 
> beacon from the message-originating station.
>
> If an IGate operator has enabled "gate all Internet to RF", the local 
> tar-n-feather gang needs to educate him on proper RF etiquette.
>
> I'm not even sure I'm going to configure my IGate to gate even my OWN 
> callsign unless it has been heard "locally" "recently".  I was going to, 
> but after watching my packets from a recent trip via aprs.fi, I really 
> don't think it is necessary nor desirable.
>
> If the IGate operator doesn't gate anything but the defaults, are there 
> risks I've not thought of?  As was mentioned, APRS-IS is already 
> effectively open to anyone that can manage to achieve a validated 
> connection (not hard) to one of the servers.  All other taps into 
> APRS-IS are already seeing the traffic.
>
> Lynn (D) - KJ4ERJ - Trying to get my IGate bi-directional
>
> Gregory A. Carter wrote:
>   
>> Unfortunately no one can prevent another from buying a HAM radio and 
>> using it for malicious intent.  Same goes for APRS, and when someone 
>> is detected abusing the service typically HAM's pull together find the 
>> abuser and report them.  OpenAPRS validates HAM's based on their 
>> callsign and then locks their abiility to send messages to only the 
>> callsign they signed up with.  I'd be happy to open up the 
>> autentication system to act as some sort of OpenID system that works 
>> for APRS-IS servers as well but that is up to the powers that be.  
>> I've never been unapproachable about things.
>>
>> The responsibility can't be placed on the "web developers" for an 
>> inherent flaw in the teir server software, we've done the best we can 
>> to prevent abuse but as you stated below it is an imperfect system.  
>> All messages, objects and position reports are logged that come from 
>> OpenAPRS so tracking abuse to an IP address is simply an email away.  
>> The true responsibility for this issue lies with the APRS-IS server 
>> operators however, as stated before I'd be happy to assist with an 
>> OpenID sort of standard.
>>
>> Greg
>>
>> NV6G
>> OpenAPRS.Net
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 4:01 PM, Steve Dimse <steve at dimse.com 
>> <mailto:steve at dimse.com>> wrote:
>>
>>     There is nothing wrong with WinLink's validation, or OpenAPRS, or
>>     findU's, the original APRS IS scheme, or even the old NOS BBS's you
>>     could telnet to (the validation question was "What is the standard
>>     offset in kHz for a 2 meter repeater?" Enter 600 and you were verified
>>     as a ham.) Weak as that was, it was probably enough. There is nothing
>>     in Part 97 that specifies the strength of the verification.
>>
>>     The problems are (1), there is no accountability for anything on the
>>     internet side. I can do absolutely anything on the internet and not be
>>     in violation of FCC Part 97. Just like while sitting in my home in
>>     Florida I am not subject to the Seattle Municipal Code, there is no
>>     jurisdiction. Compounded this with (2), any authentication scheme,
>>     OpenAPRS, WinLink, or 600 becomes worthless when you can inject
>>     validated packets into the system at the next step, the APRS IS. Since
>>     the authentication is trivially bypassed, anonymously and without
>>     guilt, that leaves the IGate operators on the hook.
>>
>>     And, this is just the US. APRS is worldwide, and there are dozens of
>>     different sets of rules that need to be considered!
>>
>>     I don't have any easy answers, I don't think there are any. At the
>>     very least I want the IGate operators to be aware of the risks others
>>     are exposing them to!
>>
>>     Steve K4HG
>>
>>     On Oct 19, 2008, at 6:33 PM, Brian Webster wrote:
>>
>>     > Is there any way to use the same methods for verification that
>>     > WinLink uses?
>>     > That would keep the training of the hams a bit simplified since it
>>     > might end
>>     > up being the same process for both systems. Just a thought. While
>>     > their
>>     > system is not rock solid perfect, it certainly is a reasonable one
>>     > that does
>>     > not seem to be abused as of yet. I would also think that whatever
>>     > method
>>     > gets put in place that a provision to open things up in the event of
>>     > an
>>     > emergency would be a good idea.
>>
>>
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